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INTRODUCTION
Some years ago Cass Sunstein wrote Lochner's Legacy,' a now clas-
sic essay on the significance and endurance of Lochner v. New York,'
where the Court invalidated what was a basic wage and hours statute
limiting the working hours for bakers because the law impermissibly
infringed on the liberty of contract protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The assessment that this par-
ticular exercise of the police power amounted to an unconstitutional
infringement of liberty rested in part on the Court's determination
that the regulation did not fall within permissible categories of state
authority. Holmes's famous admonition that the "Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"4
inaugurated a deluge of criticism on both substantive and institu-
tional grounds. Ultimately, Lochner was soundly repudiated as an ex-
ample of misguided judicial activism, supplanted ultimately by the
Court's far more deferential review of state exercise of the police
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University. My sincere thanks to Devon Carbado and Laura Gomez for comments and conver-
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Symposium and the editors of the Journal of Constitutional Law for their insight and tenacity.
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3 While allowing that state police power could legitimately impose limiting conditions on
contracts, including contracts for labor, the Court ruled that the state had exceeded the scope
of reasonable regulation because there was no reason to think that bakers as a class required
paternalist protection, nor was the regulation required to safeguard public health. The Court
intimated that the real impermissible motive was the legislature's desire "to regulate the hours
of labor between the master and his employ~s (all being men, suijuris) in a private business."
Id. at 64.
4 Id. at 75. Holmes argued this: to hold that the state could limit contracts only where the
police power was invoked to protect a weak class or secure public health was to constitutionalize
a particular economic theory regarding the proper relationship between the state and its con-
tracting citizens-in essence, a theory of non-intervention in the private domain absent special
circumstances. In his view, however, a "constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or
of laissezfaire." Id. (Holmes,J, dissenting).
5 See, e.g., Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461, 464 (1916) (criticizing the
Court for adopting and enforcing "18th century conceptions of the liberty of the individual and
of the sacredness of private property").
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power as well as the exercise of governmental power generally. 6 Over
time, the received wisdom was that Lochner was a bad decision be-
cause the Court had usurped the inherent constraints on judicial
power, and had launched an "illegitimate intrusion by the courts into
a realm properly reserved to the political branches of government.
7
Many have come to question the wisdom of Lochner, and in later
years, even the wisdom of its critics. But the unique inquiry at the
heart of Sunstein's essay was whether Lochner had really been repudi-
ated. He argued it had not: despite being formally overruled,
Lochner had reified a particular concept of neutrality that still main-
tained a grip on contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. As Sun-
stein put it, Lochner assumed:
Governmental intervention was constitutionally troublesome, whereas in-
action was not; and both neutrality and inaction were defined as respect
for the behavior of private actors pursuant to the common law, in light of
the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements. Whether there was a
departure from the requirement of neutrality, in short, depended on
whether the government had altered the common law distribution of en-
titlements. Market ordering under the common law was understood to
be a part of nature rather than a legal construct, and it formed the base-
line from which to measure the constitutionally critical lines that distin-
guished action from inaction and neutrality from impermissible partisan-
ship."
Sunstein argued if Lochner is thus understood, then it is not clear that
it has been rejected because significant aspects of current law still rest
on these assumptions.9
Notwithstanding critiques of this reading,'° I still accept Sunstein's
core insight." Indeed, this Essay extends Sunstein's thesis in this re-
6 See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (upholding a minimum wage law
for women and rejecting a challenge grounded in liberty of contract because the Fourteenth
Amendment does not protect an absolute freedom of contract or require the community "to
provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers").
7 Sunstein, supra note 1, at 874.
8 Id.
9 Sunstein stated:
Numerous decisions depend in whole or in part on common law baselines or under-
standings of inaction and neutrality that owe their origin to Lochner-like understandings.
And if Lochner is understood in these terms, its heirs are not Roe v. Wade, and Miranda v.
Arizona, but instead such decisions as Washington v. Davis, Buckley v. Valeo, Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, and various cases immunizing those who are thought not
to be "state actors" from constitutional constraints.
Id. at 875 (citations omitted).
10 See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REv. 1 (2003) (arguing
that Sunstein erroneously portrayed the Lochner-era Court as one that conceptualized the com-
mon law as the natural baseline from which to determine whether governmental regulation was
a legitimate exercise of the police power).
This is because, in my view, the central question is not whether Lochner led to a massive
intrusion of the Supreme Court into state regulation-it did not. Nor is the issue whether the
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spect: Lochner's legacy is not the only legacy with which we live. We
are still living in the shadow of a case that might be seen as Lochners
antecedent-Plessy v. Ferguson.1" Plessy's endorsement of state-
imposed racial caste, like Dred Scott v. Sandford's rejection of black
citizenship, marks a long discredited racial logic far removed from
current understandings of the law. In certain respects, that assess-
ment is correct. But in telling and tragic ways, Plessy remains intact.
Concepts of neutrality, federalism, and private ordering embraced in
Plessy arguably still infuse key debates and framings of contemporary
constitutional disputes.
Just as Lochner masked the inequities of the market as neutral,
Plessy masked racial inequality as an accepted and neutral distribution
of rights and entitlements. Hence, the structural inequality wrought
by de jure segregation was ratified and legitimated as the equal distri-
bution of rights and entitlements by race. Equal prohibition based
on race amounted to equal treatment. Lochner deferred to the com-
mon law baseline of the markets; Plessy similarly deferred to the
common law baseline of race and the notion of state sovereignty, de-
spite the Fourteenth Amendment's assertion of the primacy of na-
tional citizenship and the mandate of equal protection.
Given the tenor of the times and the trend of prevailing prece-
dent, it is plausible to argue, as some have, that Plessy was not a sur-
prising or earth-shattering case. 14 But there is value in attending to
how the Court arrived at Plessy, as that inquiry sheds insight on the
mechanics of racial power, both historically and in the present. Plessy
resolved that the Constitution protected a domain within which the
state was free to impose rules of de jure segregation consistent with
the command of equal protection. Segregation was thus permissible
as a matter of state regulation that neither interfered with federal
power over interstate commerce nor interfered with Fourteenth
Amendment rights. This interpretation in effect further cemented
the states' role in racial oppression by affirming that determinations
Lochner-era Court ever allowed that the common law was not fixed, unchanging, and natural.
The issue is whether the Lochner Court invalidated legislation as a matter of due process because
it understood that unless legislation fell within specific domains of the police power such as
public health and safety, it was constitutionally proscribed as a violation of neutrality as deter-
mined by a common law baseline. As I read it, Sunstein's insight concerns the relationship be-
tween government action, neutrality, and the status quo. The determination of what is a "sub-
sidy" or violation of neutrality necessarily depends upon the determination of a baseline that is
neither pre-political or self-evident. It is a choice.
12 In 1896, the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson ruled that a Louisiana law mandating seg-
regation of the races on railway cars was constitutionally valid. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
13 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that "a negro of African descent" may
not be a citizen of the United States).
14 See CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORIcAL INTERPRETATION 5
(1987) (arguing that the case was not "especially controversial" and was largely "invisible").
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of racial identity and the rights attendant to race were a function of
state law that did not directly implicate constitutional concerns.
From this vantage point, Pessy was not only situated within the nar-
row frame of equal protection as articulated by the post-
Reconstruction Court; it was built within the edifice of federalism to
insulate state discrimination from national intervention. Because
segregation both cohered and conflicted with the needs of a national
economy, the Court was necessarily engaged in the complex task of
managing the shifting boundaries between state and national power.
In affirming the authority of the state to impose de jure segregation
within state borders, the Court played a critical role in consolidating
state sovereignty over race and validating federalism as a constraint
on national intervention to rectify inequality. In some critical ways,
this presumption-that local law or interests are primary, even where
the guarantee of equal protection is at stake-is still with us.
Plessy relied on the bifurcation of state and national power to au-
thorize a reading of the Constitution that consigned to the states the
all-critical question of allocating whiteness-a critical prerequisite of
rights. At the same time, the Court was compelled to acknowledge
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of national citizenship and
equal protection. Yet, notwithstanding these constitutional commit-
ments, the states were free to set inconsistent and highly contradic-
tory rules regarding race in part because of notions of state sover-
eignty and investments in a particular understanding of federalism.
Plessy re-authorized state control over matters of race and, in that
sense, both hollowed out equal protection and federalized race. By
saying that race was federalized, I mean to point to the fact that regu-
lation of race and of the races was under the dual authority of both
state and nation, and that notwithstanding the reordering of federal
power under the Reconstruction Amendments and the grant of na-
tional citizenship, rights still derived first from state law. National
power remained contingent and partial.
Current law functions within the shadow of Plessy, deploying
analysis grounded in similar structural themes of neutrality, local
control, and the limited character of federal power. The current
Court's equality jurisprudence depends on distinctions between de
jure and de facto segregation, prohibiting the former while naturaliz-
ing the latter: under current decisions, the first poses a constitutional
problem while the latter does not. De facto segregation is simply the
existing state of affairs produced by private choice, and unconnected
to any past or ongoing discrimination. 5 In this regard, de facto seg-
15 In Oklahoma City v. Dowell, for example, the Court held that federal court orders mandat-
ing school desegregation should end where the board has complied in good faith and "the ves-
tiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent practicable," even though end-
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regation has become the neutral baseline and the normal state of af-
fairs. This analysis is squarely within Plessy's analytic frame that natu-
ralized racial inequality is an artifact of local control, outside the
realm of constitutional injury.
Presently, the Court's reading of equal protection further takes
place within the same limited terrain of national power. It collapses
the distinctions between race consciousness remediation and racial
discrimination and assigns to both the same standard of review as
though both were conceptually the same. 6 This too mirrors Plessy's
contention that because the racial exclusion of blacks from cars re-
served for whites signified the same thing as the racial exclusion of
whites from cars reserved for blacks, the exercise of the state police
power was reasonable. Remedial legislation that attends to race is
decidedly non-neutral and is subject to searching scrutiny while the
enactment and enforcement of laws whose foreseeable consequence
is the further entrenchment of racial inequality is insulated from
meaningful review in part because to hold otherwise would entail ju-
dicial overreaching.1
7
ing the school desegregation order would result in resegregation of the schools. 498 U.S. 237,
249-50 (1991). On this view, de facto segregation in the schools today is not connected to the
history of school segregation. But see i, at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court's standard failed to consider "the threatened reemergence of one-race schools as a rele-
vant 'vestige' of de jure segregation").
16 Compare, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (asserting that race
conscious remediation even when authorized by federal enforcement powers is subject to strict
scrutiny like de jure segregation), with Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that ra-
cial discrimination must be subject to strict scrutiny review). Of course, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003), is the most recent statement by the Court applying strict scrutiny review: race
conscious admissions policies at the University of Michigan Law School were found to be both
narrowly tailored and justified by a compelling governmental interest. But see Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003) (holding that the undergraduate race conscious admission policy did not
meet strict scrutiny review because it was not narrowly tailored). This and other evidence would
support the view that strict scrutiny is not "strict in theory and fatal in fact" as Gerald Gunther
argued it was under the Warren Court. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 8 (1972). Nevertheless, my point is that race conscious remediation is not the func-
tional equivalent of racial discrimination such that the same standard of review should apply in
the first instance. While recognizing that choosing a particular standard of review does not ine-
luctably lead to a certain outcome, I contend that the application of strict scrutiny to both state
imposed racial inequality as well as programs designed to ameliorate the effects of racial ine-
quality misdescribes social reality and is a serious conceptual error. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 245
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the differ-
ence between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat.").
17 In Adarand, the Court held that the federal government's program to promote minority
participation in federal contracting violates principles of consistency-that is that the rule is not
neutral. 515 U.S. at 222. Strict scrutiny was therefore warranted. Id. On the other hand, in
Washington v. Davis, the Court held that the administration of a test that produced racially dis-
parate results for black police department applicants did not trigger strict scrutiny review in the
absence of proof of discriminatory intent. 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). The Court reasoned that
such a rule is required because of the Court's concern that requiring the state to justify the use
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Although Plessy is generally considered a dead letter, the continui-
ties between the racial reasoning of Plessy and current debates about
race suggest a more complicated story. The particular formulation of
separate but equal endorsed by Plessy has been discredited, but
Plessy's presumptions about race, neutrality, and the scope of state
and national power arguably are with us still.
The argument proceeds as follows: Part I delineates the legal con-
text from which Plessy emerged. By legal context I mean to imply
more than the interface between segregation and equal protection. I
also mean the multiplicity of ways in which racial segregation was
enmeshed in complicated legal questions concerning the limits on
state regulatory power, the scope of congressional power under the
Reconstruction Amendments as well as in the common law of com-
mon carriers. Much of the literature on Plessy ignores or marginalizes
this doctrinal history. As a result, our understanding of the case has
been overdetermined by an equal protection framework. Broaden-
ing Plessy's doctrinal history allows us to see how doctrines that are of-
ten treated as analytically distinct produced racial logics that coa-
lesced in Plessy to form a solid jurisprudential foundation upon which
the custom and practice of race segregation could comfortably rest.
Part II exposes this foundation, revealing that P/essy helped to embed
not only racial segregation but a variety of racial logics about racial
identity, nationhood, and state sovereignty. Bound up in Plessy are
notions about the separate spheres of both race and nation; blacks
should not intrude on white sovereignty and the federal government
should not intrude on state sovereignty. Part III argues that current
equal protection jurisprudence continues to be situated within the
jurisprudential architecture of Plessy.
I. THE LEGAL MATRIX OF SEGREGATION:
COMMERCE, FEDERALISM, AND THE LAW OF COMMON CARRIERS
Plessy is an equal protection case, but it is also a decision that is
grounded in federalism, the proper scope of congressional power,
and the law of common carriers. Ultimately, the collective effect of
interlocking rules from each of these domains was to render segrega-
tion a matter of local preference, immune from federal intervention.
Determining whether state regulations proscribing or requiring seg-
regation in transportation unlawfully intruded into the federal do-
main of interstate commerce was a persistent issue for both the Su-
preme Court and state courts. Beyond local boundaries, federal law
legitimated interstate segregation by approving the regulatory author-
of neutral practices that produced racially disparate impact would open up too many statutes
and state practices to possible invalidation. Id. at 248.
[Vol. 7:3
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ity of the railroads. Despite some considerable ambivalence about
state imposed segregation, under the authority of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, railroads later implemented segregation by
regulation as a reasonable accommodation to culture and custom.
National power again authorized local control. Like slavery that pre-
ceded it, the law accommodated and rationalized de jure segregation
through the structure of federalism.
A. State Regulation and Commerce Power
De jure segregation was primarily enacted as a matter of state law.
Yet, federal constitutional law was soon implicated as inconsistencies
in local practice and custom gave rise to questions regarding whether
state segregation statutes intruded on the congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce. Both mandatory segregation and
mandatory desegregation were tested in the courts under the Com-
merce Clause. The Supreme Court articulated a formal principle
that state law could require interstate carriers to follow local rules
only with regard to passengers traveling within the state: ostensibly,
there could be no extraterritorial application of either a law imposing
segregation or a law imposing desegregation. Notwithstanding the
affirmation of neutral principle, the Supreme Court's application of
it ensured that the state's capacity to enforce segregation was far
more extensive than its ability to eliminate it.1 8 In effect, state author-
ity to regulate race was expansively read against a narrow notion of
federal commerce power.
Consider two cases from the Plessy-era interpreting state law on the
issue of access to public accommodations: Hall v. De Cuir 9 and Louis-
ville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. v. Mississippi.20 In Hall the plain-
tiff, Josephine DeCuir, a wealthy member of the "colored" Creole
community, purchased first class passage on the steamship Governor
Allen from New Orleans to her sugar plantation in Pointe Coupe Par-
ish, Louisiana.2' When she was denied access to the ladies' cabin, and
forced to remain in a small cabin at the rear of the boat, she sued the
Captain, John Benson, on the grounds that her mistreatment was
18 State court interpretations of state laws enacted in the wake of these decisions generally
respected this principle and restricted the application of state laws imposing segregation to in-
trastate travel. SeeJoseph R. Palmore, The Not-So-Strange Career of Interstate Jim Crow: Race, Trans-
portation, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1878-1946, 83 VA. L. REV. 1773, 1776 (1997). Never-
theless, the point here is that the Supreme Court's articulation of a standard did not foreclose
its implementation on terms that ensured decidedly non-neutral results.
19 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
20 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
21 See Barbara Y. Welke, When All the Women Were White, and All the Blacks Were Men: Gender,
Class, Race and the Road to Plessy 1855-1914, 13 L. & HIST. REv. 261, 284-85 (1995).
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both a constitutional violation and "an indignity to her personally," as
a well-educated and well-traveled lady.22 Consistent with the Louisi-
ana Constitution,23 state law required that public conveyances provide
equal rights and privileges to all passengers regardless of race.24
DeCuir recovered damages in the amount of $1,000.25 The boat cap-
tain appealed the case charging that Louisiana's equal accommoda-
tions law was an unconstitutional interference with the federal power
to regulate interstate commerce and an abridgement of his Four-
teenth Amendment rights to liberty and property. Common carriers
had the authority to issue rules and regulations, he argued, and given
the customary practice of segregation on riverboats, the Governor Al-
26len had a right to segregate its passengers.
The Louisiana Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the award
of damages to DeCuir. The court held that Louisiana's equal ac-
commodations law was not a regulation of interstate commerce but
rather "was enacted solely to protect the newly enfranchised citizens
of the United States, within the limits of Louisiana, from the effects of
prejudice against them., 27 The law governing common carriers pro-
hibited arbitrary discrimination between passengers. Moreover, even
apart from the statute, the Fourteenth Amendment barred the rail-
road from treating DeCuir differently than a white passenger.28
Five years after the initial lawsuit, the Supreme Court reversed.2
Even though DeCuir's ticket was for travel within the state, the Su-
preme Court deferred to the lower state court's determination that
the law extended to those carriers engaged in interstate commerce.
The Court relied on the fact that the steamboat was licensed by Con-
gress, and that the route taken at times ran inside and outside the
state of Louisiana.0 Moreover the Court reasoned, "If each State was
at liberty to regulate the conduct of carriers while within its jurisdic-
tion, the confusion likely to follow could not but be productive of
great inconvenience and unnecessary hardship."3
Of course, the same argument could apply to laws requiring race
separation: inconsistent state laws could produce "great inconven-
DeCuir v. Benson, 27 La. Ann. 1 (La. 1875).
23 LA. CONST. art. II (1868) ("All persons, without regard to race, color, or previous condi-
tion... shall enjoy the same civil, political, and public rights and privileges....").
2' LA. REV. STAT. LAW § 456 (1869) ("[C]ommon carriers.. . shall have the right to refuse to
admit any person to their railroad cars... [provided, [s]aid rules and regulations make no dis-
crimination on account of race or color ....
5 De Cuir, 27 La. Ann. at 2.
See LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 129.
27 DeCuir, 27 La. Ann. at 3.
28 Id. at 5-6.
Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 485 (1877).
so Id. at 486.
31 Id. at 489.
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ience and unnecessary hardship." The Court, however, asserted that
only Congress could regulate commerce on navigable waters and that
in light of congressional inaction, under common law, the captain of
the Governor Allen was free to adopt reasonable rules and regula-
tions governing passengers on his boat.3 2 The Court admonished in
its closing paragraphs, "If the public good requires such legislation, it
must come from Congress and not from the States."
3
In point of fact, such legislation had been adopted by Congress in
the form of the 1875 Civil Rights Act that provided for e ual access to
all places of public accommodation and conveyances.3 The Court
however, assiduously ignored the implications of the legislation for
the case. Instead, state court decisions upholding the separate but
equal formula in public education were cited in a lengthy concurring
opinion as supporting authority for the holding that separation of the
races was customary and reasonable.35
Seemingly, Hall should have settled the question of the permitted
scope of state regulation of public conveyances engaged in interstate
commerce; insofar as such regulations impacted interstate com-
merce, they were invalid. Yet in Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Rail-
way Co. v. Mississippi the Court upheld an indictment against an inter-
state railroad for failure to provide racially segregated
accommodations as required by an 1888 Mississippi law. 6 Appealing
from a conviction below, the company argued that given that the
statute in Hall was held invalid under the Commerce Clause, the Mis-
sissippi statute mandating race segregation was similarly infirm.
Surely, if a state could not prohibit race discrimination in a way that
touched interstate commerce, neither could it compel it. Notwith-
standing the clear implications of precedent, the Supreme Court dis-
32 Id. at 490.
53 Id. at 490.
See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's ruling invalidating
the Civil Rights Act). See also LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 132 (citing Louis POLLAK,
EMANCIPATION AND LAw: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS IN 100 YEARS OF EMANCIPATION 166-67
(Robert Goldwin ed., 1964) (noting that DeCuir erroneously identified the situation as one of
congressional inaction, and ignored Congress's adoption of the 1875 Civil Rights Act).
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. at 504-05 (citing, inter alia, State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198
(Ohio 1871) (upholding segregated schools in Ohio) and Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5
Cush.) 198 (Mass. 1853) (reaching a similar conclusion regarding schools in Boston)). Notably,
the concurrence pointed to the fact of sex segregation in education as justification for the rea-
sonableness of race segregation:
The Supreme Court of the State [of Ohio] held that it worked no substantial inequality
of school privileges between the children of the two classes in the locality of the parties;
that equality of rights does not involve the necessity of educating white and colored per-
sons in the same school any more than it does that of educating children of both sexes in
the same school.... Age and sex have always been marks of classification in public
schools throughout the history of our country.
Id. at 504-05.
36 133 U.S. 587 (1890).
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tinguished Hall on the grounds that, in that case, the state court had
ruled that the statute applied to interstate carriers-a finding treated
as conclusive by the Supreme Court on review. Similarly here, there
was no violation of the Commerce Clause because the state court said
the law did not affect interstate commerce. Thus, the state court's
determination of the issue was conclusive.
Certainly one explanation of these two cases is that the Court was
result driven: it simply was opposed to desegregation. Yet, regardless
of biased motive or intent, it is worthwhile to consider the analytical
structures deployed to achieve this outcome. State imposed desegre-
gation presumptively was directed at interstate passengers and thus
was unlawful. Race segregation was a matter of state prerogative pre-
sumably because its effects fell only on intrastate travel. Determina-
tions of the interstate effects of state regulation were treated as ques-
tions for state courts and those assessments were treated as
conclusive. On the other hand, desegregation could only be imposed
by Congress. Of course, under the framework of the Civil Rights
Cases, Congress was in turn constrained as state failure was a predicate
to the valid exercise of the enforcement powers. 7 This restraint was
then imposed at the same time that the states were given a domain
within which they could freely discriminate. This was yet another re-
flection of the critical role of federalism in administering segregation.
B. The Scope of Congressional Power Under
the Reconstruction Amendments
Not only was federal commerce power restricted from invading
state authority over segregation, the enforcement powers granted to
Congress under the Reconstruction Amendments were similarly con-
strained by a particular vision of what federalism required. Essen-
tially, national power could only be invoked where there was clear
evidence of state failure to protect constitutionally guaranteed rights.
This understanding of the proper relationship between state and na-
tional power was worked out in part through the particulars of segre-
gated transportation where competing values of economic liberalism
and modernization, stable racial hierarchies, and the demand for
equality were in play.
The facts on the ground changed in the wake of the war and
Emancipation, but the judicial frame through which they were inter-
preted did not. The basic framework permitted segregation to
emerge and flourish. For many whites, the end of slavery clearly trig-
37 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "Congress's legislation must necessarily be corrective in its character, addressed to coun-
teract and afford relief against state regulations or proceedings").
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gered deep anxiety about the shifting legal and social status of blacks.
Indeed, it could be said that "the value of white skin dropped when
black skin ceased to signify slave status."" While historians dispute
the question of why and when de jure segregation emerged,39 they
largely concur that the segregation of the social space was a crucial
site of contention. 4°
The approach of some carriers was to "simply carve[] a space for
black passengers from the already defined physical space."4' Steam-
boats, as the most rigidly segregated public conveyances, reallocated
space set aside for second class passengers or freight, creating the
"colored cabin" or the "freedmen's bureau."4 2  Some railroads as-
signed all blacks-women and men-to the smoking car, or a portion
of the smoking car, the rough equivalent of second class accommoda-
tions.43 In Virginia because blacks were assigned to second-class cars
no matter what fare they paid, some blacks argued for the use of sepa-
rate cars as a way of securing better accommodations." As Booker T.
Washington noted, "It is not the separation that we complain of, but
the inequality of accommodations., 45  Other rail carriers solved the
problem by offering second class fare-the only ticket the majority of
Eva Saks, Representing Miscegenation Law, 8 RARITAN REV. 39, 47 (1988). Saks points out
that this was but one of five "assaults on white property": "First, Confederate money became
worthless. Second, white southerners lost their property in slaves.... Third, land values
dropped, both in absolute price and as valued relative to the growing industrial wealth of the
North. Fourth, Lincoln and his successors intimated that major land distribution might be un-
dertaken by the federal government." Id.
39 Compare JOEL WILLIAMSON, AFrER SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN SOUTH CAROLINA DURING
RECONSTRUCTION, 1861-1877, at 275 (1965) (arguing that "while slavery necessitated a constant
physical intimacy," emancipation precipitated an immediate and revolutionary separation of the
races so that "[w~ell before the end of Reconstruction, separation had crystallized into a com-
prehensive pattern which, in its essence, remained unaltered until the middle of the twentieth
century"), with C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW (3d ed. 1974) (arguing
that legalized segregation did not immediately emerge in the wake of the war but followed only
after the struggle between elite Democrats and Populists was resolved by striking an agreement
to exclude blacks).
40 See BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE
RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865-1920, at 259 (2001) (noting the contestation between African
Americans, railroads and Southern legislators, and Congress over regulation and segregation of
public transit); WOODWARD, supra note 39, at 31-65 (describing the competing positions and
forces involved in fighting and establishing de jure segregation); Howard N. Rabinowitz, More
than the Woodward Thesis: Assessing the Strange Career ofJim Crow, 75 J. AM. HIsT. 842, 849 (1988)
(noting differing accounts of the reasons, but concurring that something significant in the
1890s fueled segregation).
41 WELKE, supra note 40, at 259.
42 Id.
Welke, supra note 21, at 276.
See LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 13 (noting that a black legislator actually introduced legis-
lation calling for the creation of separate but equal facilities in order to secure improvements).
45 A Speech Delivered Before the Women's New England Club, (Jan. 27, 1890), in 2 THE BOOKER T.
WASHINGTON PAPERS, 27-28 (Louis Harlan ed., 2000).
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blacks could afford.46 Of course, this meant that black passengers
rode in the company of white men; indeed, "these practices did not
segregate all people of color from all whites; they segregated most
people of color from white ladies."
4 7
None of these arrangements offered accommodations to blacks in
any way equal to those reserved for whites. The conditions were par-
ticularly problematic for black women and children who were forced
to ride in dirty, smoke-filled cars, exposing them not only to symbolic
or dignitary harm; under prevailing social norms, it put them at risk
of sexual assault.48 While the policy of racial separation was often jus-
tified on the grounds of protecting white women from black men's
lust, subjecting black women to encounters with white men in smok-
ing cars was treated as unproblematic in light of the longstanding
practice of white male sexual violation of black women.49
Given the uncertain boundaries between race and gender as re-
flected in the spatial arrangements on rail carriers, it is unsurprising
that enforcement was uneven and arbitrary with black women on oc-
casion being allowed and then later denied access to ladies' cars on
46 Welke, supra note 21, at 275.
47 Id. at 276.
48 Id. at 261. Booker T. Washington's description of Alabama's rail system in 1885 is illustra-
tive of the conditions:
(a) that in most cases the smoking car and that in which colored people are put are the
same; (b) when not put directly into the smoking car they are crammed into one end of
a smoking car with a door between that is as much open as closed...; (c) on some of the
roads the colored passengers are carried in one end of the baggage car, there being a
partition between them and the baggage or express; (d) only a half coach is given to the
colored people and this one is almost invariably an old one with low ceiling and it soon
becomes crowded almost to suffocation and is misery to one knowing the effects of im-
pure air. The seats in the coach given to colored people are always greatly inferior to
those given the whites. The car is usually very filthy. There is no carpet as in the first
class coach. White men are permitted in the car for colored people. Whenever a poorly
dressed, slovenly white man boards the train he is shown into the colored half coach.
When a white man gets drunk or wants to lounge around in an indecent position he
finds his way into the colored department.
Letter from Booker T. Washington to the Editor of the Montgomery, Alabama Advertiser (Apr. 24, 1885),
in 2 THE BOOKER T. WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra note 45, at 270-71, cited in LOFGREN, supra note
14, at 16.
49 Welke contrasts two cases to illustrate the point. In 1894 Cornelia Wells, an unmarried
black woman, was traveling alone in the colored compartment of a train when two drunken
white men were ejected from the first class car and put into the smoking car. The men verbally
and physically assaulted her, asserting that all "damn negroes were whores and would do it,"
exposing their private parts and ultimately physically forcing her down between the benches.
When the conductor entered to collect tickets, the men left. Bailey filed suit but lost at trial and
on appeal. On the other hand Pearl Morris, an unaccompanied white woman who was com-
pelled to ride in a Pullman coach car with black men who did not speak to her, made no ad-
vances and by all accounts were sober and respectable, recovered $2000 in damages against the
railroad for the injury of being compelled to be in the presence of black men. Welke, supra
note 21, at 314-15.
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the same line.50 These inconsistent practices provided fertile ground
for litigation. In response, the railways denied that the facilities
were inferior and endeavored to focus attention on the reasonable-
ness of the rules rather than the capricious nature of their enforce-
ment.52 The adoption of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1875 initially
gave a tremendous impetus to the demand for equality in access to
public facilities and places of public accommodation, both through
direct action and through the courts.53 As originally proposed by
Senator Charles Sumner, the bill not only proscribed racial discrimi-
nation in public accommodations, it also banned discrimination in
public schools, jury selection, and churches. Sumner advocated for
the bill from his death bed, and, two months after he passed away,
the bill was enacted in the Senate essentially intact except for the
provision relating to churches.54 However, as Republican political will
waned and white insurrectionist violence increased, the bill emerged
from the Forty Third Congress in 1875 stripped of any reference to
schools. 5 Court intrepretation further narrowed the reach of the
statute even as to public accommodations: lower federal courts in-
terpreted it to require only separate but equal accommodations for
56
the races. According to one district judge in the circuit court, this
interpretation was the only reasonable one given the fact that
[a] ny law which would impose upon the white race the imperative obliga-
tion of mingling with the colored race on terms of social equality would
be repulsive to natural feelings and long established prejudices, and
would be justly odious .... The civil rights bill neither imposes nor was
intended to impose any such social obligation. [It] ... leaves social
50 Id. at 261.
51 Indeed, the majority of cases challenging this form of segregation were brought by black
women. Id. at 268. Among the litigants was Ida B. Wells, renowned journalist and leader of
anti-lynching campaign. Id. at 270, 281. In New Orleans, a sufficient number of challenges
were successful that white businesses became cautious about violating equal accommodations
laws. See LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 20.
52 WELKE, supra note 40, at 262.
53 The Act provided: "[A]II persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be enti-
tled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privi-
leges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public amuse-
ment . . . and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous
condition of servitude." Pub. L. No. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875). Woodward reports that in North
Carolina for example, blacks in different parts of the State asserted their rights in hotels, thea-
ters, railroads, and steamboats. WOODWARD, supra note 39, at 28.
54 ERic FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 533
(1988).
55 Id. at 556.
56 See LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 135 (describing decisions of lower federal courts upholding
racial segregation despite the Civil Rights Act).
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rights and privileges to be regulated, as they have ever been, by the cus-
57
toms and usages of society.
Ultimately, this separation of spheres into the political and the so-
cial was central to the Court's logic in the Civil Rights Cases,"8 which
struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Writing for a nearly unani-
mous court, Justice Bradley's opinion held that the black plaintiffs
who were denied access to various public facilities complained of
harms that were not the result of state action, but were rather the acts
of private individuals. Hence, unless it could be established that the
state had engaged in the proscribed conduct, Congress was without
authority to enact the provision . The Thirteenth Amendment was
held to be similarly unavailing though it included no state action re-
quirement and simply banned involuntary servitude. 60 While the
Court conceded that the Amendment was directed at both the insti-
tution of slavery as well as its "badges and incidents,"'" it concluded
that "mere discriminations" by private individuals did not qualify as
constitutional violations.
57 Charge to the Grand Jury, The Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 999, 1000-01 (C.C.W.D.N.C.
1875) (No. 18,258). Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877), was also deployed in undermining en-
forcement of the Civil Rights Act. In 1879, in the case of Green v. City of Bridgeton, 10 F. Cas.
1090 (E.D. Ga. 1879) (No. 5754), the plaintiff and her three-year-old nephew sought to travel
on a steamboat from Darien, Georgia to Savannah. When she attempted to sit on the upper
deck in the only section of the boat with accommodations appropriate for a woman with a baby,
she was denied entry and ordered to the lower deck. She exited the boat at the next stop rather
than sit where directed, or be forcibly thrown from the boat. Green then sued in federal dis-
trict court for violation of the Civil Rights Act. The trial court looked to Hall for support for the
claim that the common law of common carriers governed the case. Hall was read as permitting
congressionally licensed carriers like the City of Bridgeton to adopt reasonable regulations such
as those requiring separation of the races, for it "prevented contacts and collisions arising from
natural and well known repugnancies, which are likely to breed disturbances...." Id. at 1093
(quoting W. Chester Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (Pa. 1867)). This outcome was also en-
dorsed by Bertonneau v. Board of Directors of City Schools of New Orleans, 3 F. Cas. 294, 296 (C.C.D.
La. 1878) (No. 1360a), which held that the segregation in the public schools did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, "[a] ny classification which preserves substan-
tially equal school advantages does not impair any rights, and is not prohibited by the constitu-
tion of the United States." 3 F. Cas, at 296.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
59 Id. at 11-12.
60 Id. at 23-24.
6 Id. at 20.
62 Id. at 25. In a passage remarkable for its ahistoricism, Bradley reasoned as follows:
[A] n act [refusing service or access to blacks] has nothing to do with slavery or involun-
tary servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of the party, his redress is to be sought
under the laws of the State.... It would be running the slavery argument into the
ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to
make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or
cab or car .... When a man has emerged from slavery, and by aid of beneficient legisla-
tion has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage
in the process of his elevation when he takes the rank of mere citizen, and ceases to be
the special favorite of the laws ....
Id. at 24-25.
IN THE SHADOW OFPLESSY
Prior to the Civil Rights Cases, Strauder v. West Virginia6 ' had seemed
to offer some hope that the Fourteenth Amendment was not a dead
letter: in that case, the Court overturned a state law that barred
blacks from jury service on the grounds that blacks had "the right to
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as
colored-exemptions from discriminations, imposed by public au-
thority, which imply legal inferiority in civil society, lessen the security
of their rights, and are steps toward reducing them to the condition
of a subject race."64  Similarly, aspirations may have been raised by
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, an 1886 decision that invalidated the administra-
tion of a local ordinance to effectively deny laundry licenses to all
Chinese applicants while awarding them to whites. Yet, neither
Strauder nor Yick Wo was really grounded in a sense that the Court
had a constitutional obligation to eliminate racial subordination as
part of a new constitutional order in which equality was guaranteed as
a national right. Rather, in both cases the Court acted to invalidate
the imposition of a special burden on a particular class. Although
the line between citizen and slave had been removed, the underlying
delineations between state sovereignty and national power, between
political and social rights, between subordinate and superior races,
was not disrupted significantly by the Reconstruction Amendments
and implementing legislation.
Pace v. Alabama 6 proved to be the more significant precursor to
Plessy. Under Alabama law, adultery or fornication between a same-
race couple was punishable by a maximum penalty of two years im-
prisonment or hard labor; if the same conduct was committed by a
white person and "any negro, or the descendant of any negro to the
third generation" the penalty was for two to seven years imprison-
ment or hard labor.6' A unanimous Court held that while the pur-pose of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was
Justice Harlan vigorously dissented in terms that foreshadowed his dissent in Pessy. Harlan
noted that as the majority admitted, the Thirteenth Amendment did more than abolish the in-
stitution of slavery; it also empowered Congress to "remove certain burdens and disabilities, the
necessary incidents of slavery," and "to secure to all citizens those fundamental rights which are
the essence of civil freedom." Id. at 35 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Most significantly, Harlan ar-
gued that the majority's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as entirely negative or
prohibitory in character ignored the affirmative grant of citizenship in the first clause that made
all persons born or naturalized in the United States citizens of the nation. Id. at 46. This grant
was intended to secure certain essential rights, privileges, and immunities, including most sig-
nificantly, "exemption from race discrimination in respect of any civil right belonging to citi-
zens of the white race." Id. at 48.
63 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
64 Id. at 308.
65 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
106 U.S. 583 (1883)
67 d.
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"to prevent hostile and discriminating state legislation against any
person or class of persons, ' the statute in question did not discrimi-
nate but rather imposed different punishments for different offenses,
one committed by same race couples, while the other proscribed of-
fenses that could be committed only by a couple of different races.
In the latter case "[t]he punishment of each offending person,
whether white or black, is the same."69 Plessy then extended the logic
of The Civil Rights Cases to cases where state action was clear. The Civil
Rights Cases were not simply about demarcating the private-public dis-
tinction, but were also about the limits of national power vis-a-vis the
state, which, despite the Fourteenth Amendment, had retained sov-
ereign power. Plessy clarified that the limits imposed by dual federal-
ism prevailed over the rights guaranteed by the Reconstruction
Amendments. The Civil Rights Cases curtailed the capacity of Congress
to act against what were asserted to be private actors. Plessy elabo-
rated that even where the state imposed the restrictions, they were
presumptively reasonable and imposed no constitutional injury. The
two cases combined to foreclose any form of national intervention in
state ordering of its racial affairs, except in the most narrow of cases.
C. The Law of Common Carriers
While the Court developed the framework for state exercise of au-
thority over regulation of the races, the actual doctrine that legiti-
mated racial separation as equal treatment developed in court cases
involving common carriers in both state and federal courts three
decades before Plessy. 70 Within the evolving and expanding regula-
tory frame of the common law of common carriers, courts at both
state and federal levels held that carriers were required to conduct
business in a "reasonable manner" and, with some exceptions for dis-
eased or dangerous persons, were therefore required to provide
equal service to all passengers who paid or offered to pay the requi-
site fare. At the same time, carriers had the right to establish reason-
able rules and regulations, directed towards a range of goals includ-
ing public safety, comfort, and community welfare. This authorized
carriers to set different classes of fare and accommodations and even
permitted the classification and separation of passengers within the
same fare class as long as they received substantially equal accommo-
dations. Under this logic of "equal but separate," even though the es-
tablishment of ladies' cars on railroads-the separate first class cars
rs Id. at 584.
6 Id. at 585.
70 This argument is fully developed in Lofgren's book. See LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 116-
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for women and the men who accompanied them-was a clear exam-
ple of unequal accommodations, it was accepted as natural and,
hence, lawful. 71 Importantly, de jure segregation also arose as part of
the emergent modern regulatory state.
In an effort to forestall the total abdication of national responsi-
bility signaled in the Civil Rights Cases, James O'Hara, a black Repub-
lican legislator from North Carolina, introduced an amendment to
prohibit racial discrimination in interstate travel in the bill pending
in Con ress to create the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC"). Although the amendment passed, Southern Democrats
quickly offered their amendment to the amendment that qualified
the requirement of equality: furnishing separate and equal accom-
modations would not be considered discrimination. The proposal
died in that congressional session, and the Interstate Commerce Act
adopted in 1887 made no specific reference to racial discrimination
other than section three, which barred railroads in interstate com-
merce from giving "unreasonable preference or advantage to" or im-
74posing "unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage on" anyone. In two
complaints alleging violations of section three brought by black pas-
sengers who had been denied access to or ejected from first class la-
dies' cars, the ICC adopted an interpretation that paralleled the
common law standard: racial segregation was not per se unreason-
able and indeed would be permitted under the Act so long as the ac-
commodations were substantially equal.75
71 As Welke noted, because the establishment of ladies' accommodations fit prevailing social
norms, even when white men challenged their exclusion from ladies' cars, the courts rejected
the claims and asserted nothing more than that extant social standards were evidence of the
reasonableness of the regulations. WELKE, supra note 40, at 327.
7 Id. at 343.
73 The final amended provision as approved by the House was, as Lofgren states, a "farce."
LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 141-42. In addition to requiring railroads to provide equal facilities
and accommodations it contained the following provisos:
But nothing in this act shall be construed to deny the railroads the right to provide sepa-
rate accommodations for passengers as they may deem best for the public comfort or
safety, or to relate to transportation relating to points wholly within the limits of one
State; Provided, that no discrimination is made on account of race or color; and that
furnishing separate accommodations, with equal facilities and equal comforts, at the
same charges, shall not be considered a discrimination.
Id.
74 WELKE, supra note 40, at 344.
75 See LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 142-43. In part, the holdings in the cases were the product
of what had become the common understanding-that separate but equal was a reasonable
compromise on the question of equality. Moreover, some blacks did not challenge segregation.
For example, Lofgren contends that in one case involving the violent ejection of William Coun-
cill from a car reserved for whites, Councill's lawyers admitted the railroad's right to classify by
race and argued only that the accommodations were unequal. This reflected Councill's own
political stance that "included a commitment to Negro self help within a segregationist frame-
work." Id.
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Thus, in establishing national control over interstate travel, fed-
eral administrative law affirmed that racial segregation was a proper
regulatory standard. Simultaneously, the decisions provided a tem-
plate for the states as to how they might reassert control over the
status of blacks. Three months after the Interstate Commerce Act
became law, Florida adopted the first separate coach law and in 1888
Mississippi followed suit.7 6 The result was that while state separate
coach laws incorporated the common law standard of separate but
equal, segregation was now legally mandated rather than a matter of
railroad policy.77 This usurpation of corporate discretion was not
welcomed by the railroads. While corporations were willing to decide
as a matter of policy to segregate or exclude black passengers, the
imposition of separate car laws "forced carriers to act as agents of the
state" and compelled them to take on the cost of segregation.8 For
the railroads, segregation was a matter of customer preference the
strength of which was to be weighed against the economic burden of
accommodating it. Public carriers resisted the loss of autonomy im-
posed by state regulation and sought to retain some flexible market
ordering. However, while railroads initially resisted state segregation
laws, as the laws were legitimated (at least as to enforcement within
state borders) they reassessed the value of white privilege to their cus-
tomers, and gradually embraced the "local custom" of equal but sepa-
rate accommodations.
In fact the custom of separate accommodations for ladies was the
template used to justify race segregation. In one influential case, 79
Mary (Vera) Miles contested a regulation that required blacks to sit at
one end of the cars. After she was ejected when she refused to com-
ply with the regulation, Miles sued and was awarded damages. The
railway appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on the grounds
that if she had been assigned to a seat that was not inferior, she had
no grounds to recover. The court ruled that while no one could be
excluded from a public carrier on the basis of race, the railroad's pol-
icy of assigning blacks to different seats simply took account of racial
differences and did not imply racial inferiority."' Like the separation
between women and men, such separation was a reflection of the
"natural, legal and customary difference between the black and white
races."s' Thus, "Ib]lack was to white as male was to female.""2 This
holding was issued notwithstanding the fact that in November 1867,
76 See WELKE, supra note 40, at 345.
7 Id.
78 Id.
79 W. Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 210 (Pa. 1867).
0 Id.
81 Id.; see also WELKE, supra note 40, at 213.
82 WELKE, supra note 40, at 328.
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the same month of the decision, the Pennsylvania legislature had out-
lawed race discrimination on railroads in the state. Thus, under a
rule of formal non-discrimination, racial segregation in interstate
travel was ratified as legitimate regulation by common carriers. The
assertion of federal regulatory authority through the Commerce
Clause was in part a mechanism for enforcing interstate segregation.
In this sense, an interstate regulatory scheme was standardized and
segregation was incorporated as part of a nation building project.
I have attempted to show that PLessy's doctrinal lineage transcends
equal protection. To the extent that segregation was made possible
by and expressed through other doctrinal regimes, it is crucial to con-
sider whether and to what extent those regimes laid the foundation
for and became constitutive of Plessy. As will become clear, I do not
mean to suggest that, for example, Commerce Clause jurisprudence
appeared in Plessy as such. Instead, my point is that the racial logic
underlying the Supreme Court's adjudication of Commerce Clause
cases-the distinctions between the public and the private, the rea-
sonableness of racial custom, the importance of state autonomy-has
enormous currency in Plessy. A similar point can be made about the
law of common carriers and the jurisprudence on the scope of con-
gressional power under the Reconstruction Amendments. That is to
say, Plessy is buttressed by the racial logics instantiated in both doc-
trinal areas. I will now specifically consider the work accomplished in
Plessy.
II. WHAT PLESSYDID
This Part articulates precisely what the Plessy Court did-as a mat-
ter of formal law and racial logic. As a predicate to the discussion, I
outline the broader social and political processes that made the case,
and racial segregation more generally, common sense. Part I charts
Plessy's doctrinal genealogy, while this Part examines its social and po-
litical genealogy. While the discussion is decidedly summary, it helps
to explain why Plessy "made sense" normatively, politically, and doc-
trinally.
A. Origins
The law contested in Plessy was enacted despite the fact that the
Louisiana State Constitution of 1868 provided that all public convey-
ances and businesses "shall be opened to the accommodation and pa-
tronage of all persons, without distinction or discrimination on ac-
83 See LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 121.
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count of race or color."8 4 By 1890 Louisiana was clearly in line with
the contemporary trend: between 1887 and 1892 nine states enacted
laws requiring separation of the races on railways and public convey-
ances. Of the nine statutes, five imposed criminal fines or impris-
onment on non-compliant passengers.86 Despite debates about the
extent to which segregation exceeded law,87 it is generally accepted
that the period around 1890 marked a significant increase in the turn
to legislatively mandated racial segregation.m The question is why?
In The Strange Career of im Crow, C. Vann Woodward argues that
systemic de jure segregation was the end of a process of "reconcilia-
tion of estranged white classes and the reunion of the Solid South."89
The end of slavery and the radical upheaval following the end of the
Civil War produced a crisis around resolving the place of the negro.9°
Within this unsettled space, Woodward argued that competing ide-
ologies among whites had not yet coalesced around de jure segrega-
tion. Democrats wavered on the issues while Populists on the other
hand saw blacks as potential allies, as blacks and poor whites shared
"the kinship of a common grievance and a common oppressor."'91 Ul-
timately, political fissures among whites were resolved by targeting
blacks as the source of all political and economic ills. 92
84 LA. CONST. art. XIII (1868).
For a summary of the provisions of the laws of this period, see LOFGREN, supra note 14, at
18-23. For example, Florida's law regulated first class service only and required the sale of first
class tickets to "respectable persons of color" and with the provision of separate accommoda-
tions equal to those for whites. Id. at 22. Tennessee, the first state to enact legislation mandat-
ing segregation on an equal but separate formula, required the railroads to provide separate
cars or partitioned cars in which "all colored passengers who pay first class passenger rates of
fare may have the privilege to enter and occupy, and such apartments shall be kept in good re-
pair, and with the conveniences, and subject to the same rules governing other first class
car[s]." Id. at 21. This notably did not require segregation but this was a distinction without
real significance. What was ignored apparently was the requirement that the separate facilities
be equa]. Id.
86 Id. at 22.
87 According to one historian of the period, it is important to note that in context, segrega-
tion may have actually "marked an improvement in the status of blacks, rather than a setback"
given that it often replaced not integration but racial exclusion. Rabinowitz, supra note 40, at
845-46.
ss As Rabinowitz acknowledges:
It is now clear that something highly significant happened in southern race relations
during the 1890s. Though many segregation laws were already on the books .... [t]hose
later laws, however, even when coming in new areas, did not create a new system of seg-
regation. Rather, they added the force of additional laws to a system already widespread
in practice.
Id. at 849.
89 WOODWARD, supra note 39, at 82.
90 Id. at 23 ("To the dominant whites it began to appear that the new order required a cer-
tain amount of compulsory separation of the races.").
'I Id. at 61 (quoting Tom Watson, leader of the Populists).
92 As Otto Olsen put it: "Once damned for the solidarity of his vote [for Republicans], the
Negro was now damned by both sides [Democratic and Populist Party] for dividing it, and again
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Both Populists and the Democratic Party gravitated to black dis-
franchisement as the solution to their differences and a way to make
common cause: the elite wing of the Democratic Party sought to
promote black disfranchisement as a way of currying favor with the
Populist movement that had previously seen blacks as potential al-
lies.93 In many states, the Democratic Party led organized efforts to
disfranchise black voters concurrent with the proliferation of segrega-
tion laws.94 In fact, the franchise was broadened to extend voting
rights to property-less white men at the same time that blacks were
disfranchised, arguably shifting the property required for voting from
land to whiteness.95 This expansion of democratic rights for whites
was accompanied by the contraction of black rights in a deepening
cycle of oppression. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the
area of the franchise. By 1868, a million black voters were eligible to
vote and in 1872, 700,000 voted in the presidential elections. Before
1867, there were no blacks in public office; by 1870, fifteen percent of
all officeholders in the South were black. By the early 1900s these
gains had been completely reversed.97 In Louisiana for example, in
1896 there were 130,334 black voters. By 1904 there were 1,342.98
While Louisiana had elected a black governor, and over 120 black
legislators served in the state legislature through Reconstruction, the
last black member left by 1900. There was not another black legisla-
tor in Louisiana until 1967.99
Black subordination thus was central to the process of democrati-
zation for poor whites. The consolidation of de jure segregation in
the South constituted one of the material benefits of racial exclusion
and subjugation that functioned to stifle class tensions among whites.
became the scapegoat and victim of the unsolved problems of the South." OTTO H. OLSEN, In-
troduction to THE THIN DISGUISE: TURNING POINT IN NEGRO HISTORY 1, 22 (Otto H. Olsen ed.,
1967).
93 LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 24-25.
94 See id. (noting that in all states that passed a separate car law except two, there "was con-
current-and in fact, generally more vigorous debate over black disfranchisement").
95 Raymond T. Diamond & RobertJ. Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana's Racial Classification
Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L. REV. 255, 260 n.26 (1983) (stating that the dis-
franchisement of free black voters often occurred at the same time that property requirements
were abolished for white voters).
96 As Woodward reports, progressivism among whites was linked to racial exclusion. One
Southern educator argued: "In fine .... disenfranchisement of the negroes has been concomi-
tant with the growth of political and social solidarity among the whites." WOODWARD, supra
note 39, at 92.
97 See STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH, 1944-1969, at 1-16
(1976) (reporting on the organized disfranchisement of the black vote in the South in the pe-
riod following Reconstruction).
98 WOODWARD, supra note 39, at 83-85. This pattern was common all over the southern
states.
See CHARLES VINCENT, BLACK LEGISLATORS IN LOUISIANA DURING RECONSTRUCTION 220
(1976).
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Even when the lower class whites did not collect increased pay as a
consequence of white privilege, whiteness still yielded what W.E.B.
DuBois called a "public and psychological wage.' 0 These were rela-
tive benefits certainly, but crucial nonetheless.
Gender also figured into the complex matrix of race relations.
That is, as Barbara Welke has argued, part of the answer to the ques-
tion of why things changed in the 1890s lies in "[t]he unwavering
goal of white Southerners to protect white womanhood, the em-
bodiment of the idea of the South."'0 ' Historically, railroads and
steamboats had separated passengers by sex and class, creating privi-
leged facilities for women. When women of color sought "the privi-
leges of their gender[and] challenged courts to justify a system that
would require a woman of color paying first-class fare to accept [infe-
rior] accommodations," 102 the law of common carriers responded by
permitting carriers to impose race segregation on the condition that
they provided substantially equal accommodations-equal but sepa-
rate to all passengers in the same fare. Reluctant to take on the addi-
tional expense imposed by such a requirement, many carriers began
to allow "respectable" women of color to have access to first class la-
dies' accommodations. The eroding wall of separation "guarding
Southern white woman's sacred place-and hence white suprem-
acy"-produced the apprehension that legislative action was required
to maintain the lines that were otherwise insufficiently safeguarded.
0 3
Control of interracial intimacy, like control of access to public ac-
commodations, was a key test of states' rights. For southern states in
particular, the expansion of federal power through the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments opened up the possibility that interracial sex and
interracial marriage might become lawful as a matter of federal law. '0
The result was that anti-miscegenation provisions were included in
the post Civil War constitutions of six Southern states10 5 and several
states passed laws tightening the restrictions of and penalties for mis-
cegenation in the wake of Reconstruction.
0 6
Thus, the rationale for segregation was framed within a moderni-
zation project and rectification of the error of Reconstruction. Stabi-
100 W.E.B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 700 (1935) (David Levering Lewis
ed., Simon & Schuster 1992). For a cogent and rigorous exposition of the DuBois thesis, see
DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS (1991).
101 Welke, supra note 21, at 266.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 266-67.
104 Saks notes that Reconstruction and the growth of national power "put state court judges
of miscegenous bodies-white men charged with upholding state criminal law against federal
constitutional challenges-on the defensive on many levels: sexual, economic, professional and
political." Saks, supra note 38, at 44.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 48.
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lizing the uncertain racial dynamics was cast as a key to stabilizing the
labor market and reintegrating the South into the national econ-
omy.'07 This formed a counterweight to the railroad's quest for
autonomy and efficiency. In a sense, both were competing discourses
of progress. By the time that a law "to promote the comfort of pas-
sengers" that required the provision of "equal but separate accom-
modations for the white, and colored races" on railways in the state
was introduced into the Louisiana legislature in May of 1890,18 ac-
cording to one daily newspaper in New Orleans, there was "an almost
unanimous demand on the part of the white people of the State for
the enactment of such a law."'09
B. The Case and the Decision
Plessy developed as the culmination of a racial project that had
enlisted federal constitutional law with regard to the scope of the
congressional power, federalism, and the common law. Common
carriers under common law had developed the framework of railway
regulation that affirmed equal and separate as "reasonable" regula-
tion, even if interstate travel congressional power did not extend to
the direct regulation of race and racial subordination and the com-
merce power did not proscribe the intrastate exercise of state police
power that enacted segregation.
Louisiana's "equal but separate accommodations" law had initially
been challenged on the grounds that its application to interstate
travel conflicted with federal authority over commerce. In February
of 1892, Daniel Desdunes purchased a first class ticket to Mobile, Ala-
bama on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and took a seat in a car
reserved for whites. When arrested and charged with a criminal of-
fense under the enactment, Desdunes asserted that as a passenger in
interstate travel, only Congress had the authority to regulate his
travel."0 Under the prevailing rules, Desdunes argued that either the
law did not apply to interstate travel or, if it did, it was unconstitu-
tional under the Commerce Clause. While Desdunes awaited a ruling
in his case, on May 25 the Louisiana Supreme Court decided the case
of Louisiana ex rel. Abbott v. Hicks."' In Hicks, a train conductor was
prosecuted for admitting a black passenger traveling interstate into a
car reserved for whites. The Louisiana court held that such regula-
107 SeeJames Cobb, Segregating the New South: The Origins and Legacy of Plessy v. Ferguson, 12
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1017, 1018 (1996) (arguing that racial separation emerged as a part of efforts
to industrialize the South and reintegrate it with the national economy).
108 See 1890 La. Acts 111, at 152-54.
109 See Olsen, supra note 92, at 9 (citing NEW ORLEANS DAILY PICAYUNE,JULY 10, 1890).
110 LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 34.
1 11 So. 74 (La. 1892).
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tions were valid only as to travel within the state; its application to in-
terstate passengers constituted a regulation of interstate commerce
prohibited by the Constitution."2 The ruling effectively determined
the outcome in Desdunes's case and the charges were dismissed.
A new plaintiff was found to challenge the intrastate application
of the law. On June 7, 1892, Homer Plessy purchased a first class
ticket on the East Louisiana Railroad for passage from New Orleans
to Covington, Louisiana. He entered the train and took the seat in a
compartment reserved for whites. As previously arranged, the con-
ductor of the train ordered Plessy to leave the car "under penalty of
imprisonment" and to go to the section of the train reserved for "the
colored race." When Plessy refused, a police officer was called, Plessy
was forcibly ejected from the train and imprisoned in the New Or-
leans parish jail, where he was charged and, after posting $500 bond,
was released.
Because the case presented only the question of intrastate travel,
Plessy's lawyers could not specifically argue that segregation inter-
fered with interstate commerce, but in their briefs they had pointed
out that conflicting state standards could not be considered reason-
able regulation, evoking an image of inconsistent state laws that could
impede the flow of commerce. Plessy's lawyers appealed to the need
for central authority-federal power-to control state legislative au-
thority.
Similarly, determinations of race were fraught, as they were un-
derwritten by inconsistent standards that were haphazardly applied.
A common carrier could not be authorized to distinguish between
citizens according to race, given the difficulty of making racial classi-
fications. Indeed, Plessy challenged that the state had no power to
confer to any person the authority "to determine [race] without tes-
timony or to make the rights or privileges of any citizen of the United
States dependent on the fact of race or its determination by such un-
authorized person, to compel the citizen to accept such determina-
tion, or to make refusal to comply with same a penal offence.""2. De-
terminations of racial identity were complex questions of law and fact
beyond the competence and authority of any railway employee. The
observations of such employees were far from scientific, certain, or
clear, and additionally embodied white domination." 4 As one of the
112 Id. at 76.
113 Defendant's Plea to Information at 17, Louisiana v. Plessey, No. 19,117 (Crim. Dist. Ct.
Orleans Parish, filed with petition Nov. 22, 1892), pet. denied Ex Parte Plessy, 11 So. 948 (La.
1892) (No. 11,134), affd sub nom. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 15,248).
11 They could not be given the pervasive nature of "racial mixing": "in all parts of the coun-
try, race intermixture has proceeded to such an extent that there are great numbers of citizens
in whom the preponderance of the blood of one race or another, is impossible of ascertain-
ment, except by careful scrutiny of the pedigree.... [Because of the ban on slave marriages] in
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briefs argued: "There is no law of the United States, or of the State of
Louisiana defining the limits of race-who are white and who are
'colored'? By what rule then shall any tribunal be guided in deter-
mining racial character?"
15
The Act further deprived a citizen of a remedy for a wrong, since
it provided that neither the railway company nor the conductor
would be liable for damages arising from the placement or removal
of passengers." 6 Because the state was without power to grant exclu-
sive rights and privileges to one race that were denied to another, the
Act established "an invidious distinction and discriminate [d] between
citizens of the United States based on race" in violation of the Thir-
teenth and Fourteenth Amendments.1
7
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Act did not violate ei-
ther Amendment."" Citing the Civil Rights Cases, the court concluded
that the case did not implicate rights guaranteed by the Thirteenth
Amendment, as segregation in public facilities was not a badge or in-
cident of slavery." 9 The sole question was whether a statute requiring
railways traveling intrastate to provide separate cars for the races and
requiring passengers to confine themselves to those cars violated the
Fourteenth Amendment.2 ° The court conceded that Louisville, New
Orleans & Texas Railway v. Mississippi2' had not specifically resolved
the matter, since that precedent governed only the question of
whether passengers could be racially classified and excluded. Never-
theless, the court concluded that the question of restricting passen-
gers to accommodations separated by race was not difficult in light of
numerous decisions establishing the "principle that, in such matters,
equality, and not identity or community, of accommodations is the
extreme test of conformity to the requirements of the [F]ourteenth
[A] mendment."
2
Precedent from other jurisdictions and other eras was enlisted to
support this principle. Citing Roberts v. City of Boston,12 a pre-Civil War
Massachusetts case upholding the legality of race segregation in pub-
lic schools, the court argued that neither racially separate schools nor
racially separate facilities violate the equal protection guarantee even
a majority of cases, even an approximate determination... is an actual impossibility." Brief for
Plaintiff in Error at 10, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), available at 1893 WL 10660.
115 Id. at 11.
16 1890 La. Acts 111, at 152-54.
117 Defendant's Plea at 18, Louisiana v. Plessey (No. 19,117).
118 ExpartePlessy, 11 So. 948 (La. 1892).
19 Id. at 949.
12o Id. at 950.
12 133 U.S. 587 (1890) (upholding an indictment against an interstate railroad for failure to
provide racially segregated accommodations as required by an 1888 Mississippi law).
12 ExpartePlessy, 11 So. at 950.
123 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850).
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if motivated by some animus, because law had no bearing on senti-
ment or the social structure of racial hierarchy. As Roberts stated:
"This prejudice if it exists, is not created by law, and probably cannot
be changed by law."'' 2 4 Thus, the regulation in Plessy, like that in Rob-
erts, was a reasonable exercise of the police power in which a distinc-
tion was drawn on the basis of race. This distinction did not consti-
tute unlawful discrimination. Indeed,
[t] he statute applies to the two races with such perfect fairness and equal-
ity that the record brought up for our inspection does not disclose
whether the person prosecuted is a white or a colored man. The charge
is simply that he did 'then and there, unlawfully, insist on going into a
coach to which, by race, he did not belong.' Obviously, if the fact
charged be proved, the penalty would be the same whether the accused
were white or colored. 25
This was the essence of equality.
In large part, the Supreme Court's opinion in Plessy endorsed the
logic of the state court's decision. There was no conflict with the
Thirteenth Amendment as a statute "which implie[d] merely a dis-
tinction between the white and colored races-a distinction which is
founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so
long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color" did
not undermine legal equality or "reestablish a state of involuntary
servitude.' 26  As the Louisiana state court argued, the Fourteenth
Amendment similarly posed no bar as the rule imposed equal penal-
ties on the races, and regulated the state's domestic commerce-a
domain outside of the reach of federal law.12 7  The law was self-
evidently reasonable given that a contrary finding would contradict
precedent and critically establish a new precedent authorizing the
removal of similar laws establishing separate schools. Like the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court, the Court pointed to the ubiquitous practice
of school segregation as evidence that these distinctions were non-
discriminatory, unlike the exclusion of blacks from juries as in
Strauder v. West Virginia.12 The Court further cited Roberts as evidence
that these practices and this interpretation were sound.12 9 Against the
reading of the Civil Rights Cases offered by Plessy's counsel, the Court
asserted that its holding supported the validity of the law: the case es-
tablished that the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to
act only where the state had acted to undermine or subvert "funda-
124 Id. at 209.
125 ExpartePleusy, 11 So. at 950.
126 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896).
127 Id.
128 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (overturning a state law that barred blacks from jury service).
1 P/essy, 163 U.S. at 544-45 (citing Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850)).
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mental rights specified in the amendment." ° Such rights were not
implicated in a law commanding the enforced separation of the races
in intrastate travel."3 The law was inherently neutral in its treatment
of the races, imposing penalties on blacks and whites alike for violat-
ing its proscriptions.
The case then was simply a matter of whether Louisiana's judg-
ment about its own local "established usages, customs and traditions"
was to be supplanted by the Court."2 Reasonableness was the touch-
stone and according to the Plessy majority, "there must necessarily be
a large discretion on the part of the legislature."' The Court's rea-
soning respected and upheld segregation as a local prerogative im-
mune from federal intervention. The sense of the majority opinion
was that to do otherwise would offend local sovereignty and the basic
ordering of federalism.
This same sensibility infused the Court's discussion of Plessy's
claim that the train conductor's seating assignments by race
amounted to an arbitrary and unauthorized deprivation of the prop-
erty in whiteness that offended constitutional requirements of due
process. The initial move was to avoid the issue altogether on the
grounds that the issue of Plessy's race did not "properly arise on the
record."3 4  Because there was nothing to indicate that Plessy had
been improperly classified, no claim for a lack of judicial process in
reviewing an improper classification would lie. The record however
130 Id. at 546-47.
131 "[Wle think the enforced separation of the races, as applied to the internal commerce of
the State, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his
property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws, within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment... ." Id. at 548.
132 Id. at 550.
1"3 Id.
1 Id. at 549. This assertion reprised Judge Ferguson's answer to the application for the
writs:
Respondent respectfully avers that nowhere in the information against the said Homer
A. Plessy... is it alleged either that the said Homer A. Plessy was a white man or a col-
ored man, or that he belonged to the white race or to the colored race; nor is it any-
where in the .... plea to the jurisdiction [filed by Plessy] either pleaded, averred, or
admitted that the said Homer A. Plessy is a colored man or belongs to the colored
race .... Respondent further avers that instead of pleading, averring, or admitting that
[he] was of and did belong to the colored race, the said Homer A. Plessy, on the con-
trary, declined and refused, either by pleading or otherwise, to acknowledge and admit
that he was in any sense or in any proportion a colored man.
Answer of Respondent at 23, Ex Parte Plessy, 11 So. 948 (La. 1892) (No. 11,134), affd sub nom.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 15,248).
Ferguson argued that the affidavit made before the recorder attached to the petition for a
writ of prohibition was not part of the proceedings in the court below. Therefore, Ferguson
claimed, "Respondent respectfully represents that, so far as the proceedings in his court are
concerned, he does not, cannot, and will not know until the trial of the said Homer A. Plessy...
whether [he] was a white man or a colored man insisting upon going into and remaining in a
compartment of a coach to which, by reason of his race or color, he did not belong." Id. at 24.
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was replete with evidence concerning the question of Plessy's race
both as a part of the state's case against Plessy and his defense against
it. While the information filed against Plessy had failed to specify his
race, it stated that the conductor had assigned Plessy to the coach
used for the race to which he belonged, and that he unlawfully in-
sisted on going into a coach to which by race he did not belong.35
The affidavit of the arresting officer filed before the Recorder's Court
and attached to the petition for the writs, asserted that Plessy was a
passenger of "the colored race."'' 36  Moreover, Plessy's petition for
writs of prohibition and certiorari had alleged that Plessy was "of
mixed Caucasian and African descent in the proportion of seven-
eighths Caucasian and one-eighth African blood."37 In another
document filed with the Court by Plessy's lawyers, he was described as
an "octoroon."1s8 Despite the Court's claim that the determination of
Plessy's race was not properly raised by the record, in fact there was
little doubt that the record contained facts pertaining to Plessy's ra-
cial identity albeit he did not identify himself as "white" or "colored"
in the explicit terms of the statute. Further, the pleadings left no
doubt that race and the authority to determine it were at the heart of
his case.
While not ceding the point, the Court turned to the question of
improper racial assignment assuming that it had been properly pre-
sented. The Court concluded that if Plessy were white, any injury to
his reputation would be adequately compensated by an action for
damages against the company, given that counsel for the state had
conceded that the statute's liability exemption for conductors was
unconstitutional. 139 Here the Court rested on the by now familiar as-
sumption that state law determinations of this issue precluded any
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Writs of Prohibition and Cert. at 1, ExPartePlessy (No. 11,134).
3 The Assignment of Errors filed with the application for the writ further asserted that
"[t]he statute impairs the right of passengers of the class to which relator belongs, to wit, octo-
roons, to be classed among white persons, although their color be not discernable in their
complexion, and makes penal their refusal to abide by the decision of a railroad conductor in
this respect." Assignment of Errors at 49, Ex Parte Plessy (No. 11,134).
'39 The Court stated:
It is claimed by [Plessy] that, in any mixed community, the reputation of belonging
to the dominant race, in this instance the white race, is property, in the same sense that a
right of action, or of inheritance, is property. Conceding this to be so, for the purposes
of this case, we are unable to see how this statute deprives him of, or in any way affects
his right to, such property. If he be a white man and assigned to a colored coach, he
may have his action for damages against the company for being deprived of his so-called
property. Upon the other hand, if he be a colored man and be so assigned, he has been
deprived of no property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a
white man.
Pessy, 163 U.S. at 549 (emphasis in original).
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meaningful constitutional question for the Court to consider:
Plessy's claim of misclassification raised no constitutional concern as
race was a matter to be determined by the law of the state.' 40 At the
same time, however, the Court's decision lent support to the notion
of race reputation as a property interest that required the protection
of law through actions for damages. It did not specifically consider
any particular rule of race definition, but it protected the boundaries
of whiteness even as it denied the constitutional relevance of race de-
terminations within a regime of enforced racial segregation.
Notwithstanding the conflict between jurisdictions that set the
standard for whiteness as "a preponderance of [white] blood" as dis-
tinct from a rule requiring three fourths white "blood, ''4' the Court
deferred to state law as the legitimate source of racial definitions,
even as it declined to consider Plessy's racial status. The only qualifi-
cation imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment was formal state neu-
trality: that the statute proposed the imposition of penalties for black
and white alike and rested on the fiction of equal but separate ac-
commodations was sufficient to meet the constitutional standard. At
the same time the Court affirmed state power to maintain racial clas-
sifications that were arbitrary, conflicting, and grounded in the in-
herent asymmetry of white domination, the Court emphasized the
neutral aspect of the law as evidence that race was irrelevant to the
case. Disconnecting racial identities from subordination, past and
present, allowed the Court to legally reconstruct white and black as
formally equal racial categories, whose boundaries were properly de-
termined by state law. In this regard, Plessy's constitutional claim
rested upon and ultimately was swallowed by the deference to state
sovereignty. Equal protection was hollowed out and race was federal-
ized on terms consistent with the pre-Reconstruction constitutional
structure. While situated within a larger national scheme, like slav-
ery, segregation was a domestic institution, largely immune from fed-
eral intervention. This vision of federalism was then critical tojusti-
fying and legitimating dejure segregation.
The legislation at issue in Plessy "represented not so much an ini-
tial resort to law, but a change in the place of segregation within the
140 Id.
141 The Court stated: "It is true that the question of the proportion of colored blood neces-
sary to constitute a colored person, as distinguished from a white person, is one upon which
there is a difference of opinion in the different States .... But these are questions to be de-
termined under the laws of each State and are not properly put in issue in the case." Id. at 552
(citations omitted).
142 See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (holding that the Constitution pro-
hibited states from enacting laws that prevented the use of force in returning individuals into
slavery as such legislation unlawfully inhibited or interfered with the right of slaveowners to the
return of their property).
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legal matrix." 43 That change placed law more squarely in the fore-
front of ratifying what had been common practice but now took on
increased importance in disciplining the potential for black freedom,
restoring racial and economic order, and reuniting the nation. Plessy
arguably played an important role in consolidating the national iden-
tity as white in the post-Reconstruction period. The consignment of
blacks to second class cars was the daily and public re-instantiation of
their status as second class citizens who, while formally included in
the nation, could not in any way stand for the nation.144 In affirming
the legitimacy of that status, Plessy inaugurated a new formalist ac-
count of race and equality that facilitated the continuation of racial
subordination even within a revised constitutional framework. Not-
withstanding the explicit enactment of constitutional authority to
eliminate racial subjugation, and implicit restraints on state power
imposed by the Commerce Clause, Plessy's conception of power re-
mains grounded in a commitment to federalism that translated into
protection for state authority to impose and legitimate privately im-
posed racial inequality.
III. PLESSY'S CONTEMPORARY MEANING
Of course, rules of equal prohibition like those in Plessy are no
longer seen as consistent with the constitutional mandate of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The absurdity of Plessy and the basic reason
de jure segregation has been repudiated is that, as Harlan argued,
the Court ignored the obvious and conclusive evidence that segrega-
tion was the product of the intent to impose racial subordination.
However, contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence coheres com-
fortably with PLessy's conceptions of neutrality and federalism. Plessy's
asymmetrical neutrality is most evident in the Court's justification for
application of strict scrutiny review to rules implicating race. Plessy's
deference to state authority in limiting the scope and indeed the pos-
143 LOFGREN, supra note 14, at 201.
4 As Toni Morrison has pointed out:
It is no accident and no mistake that immigrant populations... understood their
"Americaness" as an opposition to the resident black population.
Deep within the word "American" is its association with race. To identify someone
as South African is to say very little; we need the adjective "white" or "black" or "colored"
to make our meaning clear. In this country, it is quite the reverse. American means
white ....
TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 47 (1992).
Indeed, it could be said that "Pessy was a landmark case not because it drastically altered the
direction of legislation and juridical thought, but because it concluded the process of transfig-
uring dual constitutional citizenship into dual racial citizenship that had unfolded since the
end of Reconstruction." Eric Sundquist, Mark Twain and Homer Plessy, 24 REPRESENTATIONS 102,
111 (1988).
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sibility of any federal intervention is most evident in the recent cases
involving the scope of Section 5 powers. In this respect, the logic of
Plessy has not been fully repudiated.
In Plessy, the Court abandoned the conception of race as a natural
hierarchy-what Neil Gotanda calls status race-and embraced for-
mal race, in which race is seen as a "neutral, apolitical description[],
reflecting merely 'skin color' or region of ancestral ori-
gin.., unrelated to ability, disadvantage, or moral culpability.'
145
Under Plessy's logic, race became a formal identity category discon-
nected from history and from subordination, past and present. As
Gotanda has argued, Plessy's shift to a formalist account of race was a
major contribution to sustaining racial hegemony.'4 Indeed, Plessy
initiated an alternate construction of race that has proven highly du-
rable and adaptable to changing conditions: the idea is that whatever
race is (a matter of biology, a question of state law, a set of social cus-
toms), all racial identities are the same and all racial distinctions are
prohibited whether for good or bad reasons. These are the principal
justifications invoked today for the imposition of strict scrutiny to all
forms of state invocation of race, even when deployed to remediate
acknowledged state imposed racial injuries: white and black or, for
that matter, all other non-white racial categories are symmetrically
situated and thus the same equal protection analysis applies.1
47
My point is not that the material significance of race is precisely
the same now as it was in 1896. Rather, my argument is that the
Court's current conceptualization of neutrality mirrors that of the
Plessy Court and produces a similar result: racial inequality is virtually
irremediable under the Constitution. While the line has moved with
regard to what counts as racial discrimination-rules of equal prohi-
bition based on race now look plainly unconstitutional-the prevail-
ing logic has reconstituted a conception of race which renders the
145 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1991).
4 Gotanda points out:
Formal-race and sotus-race offer two differing interpretations of Jim Crow segrega-
tion. Under the status-race approach, which assumes the subordinated status of blacks,
racial segregation by custom or statute reflects a "common-sense" understanding of the
"natural" racial hierarchy; in contrast, the formal-race, color-blind approach assumes
"equal protection of the law" based on common "citizenship." Given these assumptions,
racial segregation is simply a legislative differentiation that must be considered to have
no social meaning.
Id. at 38.
147 Since 1989, the Court has moved the doctrinal framework on race-conscious remediation
from tentative approval and intermediate review in split opinions to a solid majority in favor of
strict scrutiny of affirmative action programs. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547 (1990) (holding that a race-conscious licensing program adopted by the federal govern-
ment was subject to intermediate review), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515
U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that the proper standard of review for all race-conscious affirmative
action programs is strict scrutiny).
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asymmetrical allocation of power, access, and rights by race as consti-
tutional and consistent with the equal protection guarantee. The
Plessy Court relied on formal race-the idea that race has no social
meaning or relevance-in deciding that the Louisiana statute requir-
ing racial separation in public carriers was consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause. 148 So, too, does the prevailing majority of the cur-
rent Court rest its analysis upon the assertion that race is fundamen-
tally irrelevant and signals nothing more than skin color.
Just as the Pessy Court's conception of equality was deeply inter-
twined with its particular view of federalism and state sovereignty, the
current Court's rationales reveal these same interconnections. That
such a relationship exists is perhaps unsurprising: as the Court stated
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, "every claim aris-
ing under the Equal Protection Clause has implications for the rela-
tionship between national and state power under our federal sys-
tem." 4  What is striking is the similarity between current and past
conceptions of federalism and the limits of national power.
Decisions have resuscitated Plessy's interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause that assigned to the federal government a subordi-
nate role relative to the states in protecting the right to be free from
discrimination. In so doing, the Court has embraced a version of
federalism and states' rights that echoes Plessy's segregationist logic.
Notable evidence that the Court is in the grips of an era long past
is United States v. Morrison, which struck down a section of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act that authorized civil actions against perpe-
trators of gender-motivated violence.' ° Here the Court rejected con-
gressional authority under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the law because the measure
violated principles of dual federalism and state sovereignty, both of
1 Thus, as I have argued, "the Supreme Court's insistence on the extension of strict scrutiny
to all uses of race, even when deployed to remediate long-standing patterns of racial inequality,
represents the repackaging of the formalist precepts about race implicit in the reasoning and
holding of the Court's majority in Pemy." Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction
of Inequality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1753, 1766 (2001). Other scholars Ihave similarly critiqued the
racial formalism at the heart of Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). In that case, the same major-
ity that decided Adarand invalidated the creation of majority-minority congressional districts as a
remedy for past voting ights violations because a "reapportionment plan that includes in one
district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another
but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid." Id. at
647. As a result, all efforts to remedy the egregious patterns of racial exclusion of minorities
from political power are subjected to the same level of review as the underlying violations that
gave rise to the remedy. Consequently, "Shaw fits squarely into a tradition of abstract, formalis-
tic judicial actions, emblemized by the infamous [Dred Scott] and [Pessy] decisions, which did so
much to buttress white supremacy." J. MORGAN KoUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE 7 (1999).
149 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973).
150 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
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which limit the federal government's power to enforce antidiscrimi-
nation laws. Because the state's authority is primary, the Court held
that Congress was powerless to act against individual, as distinct from
state, actors.51 The Court came to this conclusion despite a volumi-
nous record establishing that states had systematically failed to pro-
tect or to vindicate the civil rights of women like the plaintiff, who
had been victimized by sexual assault.'52  Morrison, remarkably,
reached backward to the post-Reconstruction era, citing the Civil
Rights Cases as precedent to support its reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment partly on the grounds of "the insight attributable to
Members of the Court at that time[, who each] had intimate knowl-
edge and familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment."' Presumably the fact of proximity in time
to the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment afforded the post-
Reconstruction Court greater interpretive authority, but this claim
requires the complete disregard of the role of that earlier Supreme
Court in ignoring the history of the Reconstruction Amendments.
The genesis of the Fourteenth Amendment lies in the historic failure
of the states to protect the rights of their citizens.5 4 Indeed like the
Plessy-era Court, the Court in Morrison turned a blind eye to history
and contemporary reality, specifically here the abysmal record of
state failure in enforcing equality.
5
The Morrison Court's hostility to congressional action here is
grounded in the asserted need to cabin federal legislative power lest
it disrupt the balance between state and national authority. More
specifically, Morrison's logic is rooted in the proposition that the Con-
stitution did not confer on Congress the power to encroach upon the
authority and rights of the states; thus, federal efforts to enforce anti-
151 See id. at 621-26.
152 See id. at 628-36 (SouterJ., dissenting).
153 Id. at 622.
154 See Sarah Louise House, Note, Alden v. Maine: Protecting the States at the Expense of the Peo-
ple, 62 LA. L. REv. 275, 289 (2001) (arguing that the Civil War Amendments were passed to ad-
dress the South's failure to protect the rights of newly emancipated black people and that in so
doing, Congress intended to change the relationship between the states and national power
with regard to rights).
1 As Robin West argues:
[Tihe Equal Protection Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment within which it appears,
read as forbidding the states to neglect to protect their citizens, envision[] a thoroughly
political, not legal, response to such failures: the clause empowers Congress, not the
Court, to address those failures through federal legislation. The response envisioned by
the Fourteenth Amendment itself, to states' failure to protect their citizens against vio-
lence, in other words, is passage of legislation such as an anti-lynching law, a law restrict-
ing hate groups, or the Violence Against Women Act. In all cases, the envisioned federal
legislation responds to the failure of states to protect citizens against the adverse affects
of unchecked private violence.
Robin West, Is Progressive Constitutionalism Possible?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP.J. 1, 5-6 (1999) (empha-
sis in original) (citations omitted).
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discrimination law cannot infringe on state sovereignty. The underly-
ing vision of the proper relationship between state and national
power animating the majority's view is the nineteenth century vision
of federalism under which the state's imposition of de jure segrega-
tion as well as its determinations of racial identities were domestic
regulations immune from federal intervention.
15 6
Decisions limiting the power of Congress to enact laws implicating
equality concerns have been predicated on the view that only valid
exercises of Congress's Section 5 powers can abrogate the state's sov-
ereign immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment.' 57 Here,
too, state sovereignty is jealously guarded against the national gov-
ernment's attempt to enforce anti-discrimination norms and laws
against the state. It is state prerogatives that are given primacy, not
the need to vindicate the constitutional rights of the state's citizens.
CONCLUSION
Given the massive social change that has occurred since Brown v.
Board of Education'58 more than fifty years ago, it may seem implausible
to assert that we are still living within the framework of a case that
Brown ostensibly repudiated. And of course, in profoundly important
ways that world has changed since Plessy. Even conservative scholar
Robert Bork noted that Plessy could no longer be sustained because
the background circumstances changed.5 9 Justice Harlan's assertion
in 1896 that "[e]veryone knows that the statute had its origin in the
purpose ... to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or
assigned to white persons,"' 60 exposed that even then the underlying
circumstances were a far cry from the formal equality proclaimed by
the majority. What has been more resistant to change however is the
notion that the principal danger to liberty lies in a robust vision of
equality that might somehow supplant state autonomy and the values
156 Robert Post and Reva Siegel assert:
[T]here is nevertheless something telling in Morrison's recourse to these decisions of the
first Reconstruction.... [The cases relied upon by Morrison] present an account of our
federal system in which there are large stretches of state municipal law free from federal
interference.
This was the understanding of federalism that pervasively shaped the Court's inter-
pretation of the Constitution in the decades after the Civil War.
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After
Morrison and Kimel, 110YALE L.J. 441,483 (2000).
157 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
15s 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of children in public schools solely on the
basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other tangible factors may be equal, violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
159 ROBERT BORW, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 74-76,
81-82 (1990).
160 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896).
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of federalism. Plessy's underlying default to state sovereignty reiter-
ated a pattern that continues to cast a long shadow over today's un-
derstandings of the relationship between state and national authority
in the critical realm of equality. As we move fully into the twenty-first
century, we would do well to move out of the shadow and into the
light.
